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History never repeats itself, but the kaleidoscopic combina-
tions of the pictured present often seem to be constructed out of 
the broken fragments of antique legends.
(Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, 1873)
Introduction
T
he challenge of the construction of the European project 
came at a critical juncture in the history of the foreign pol-
icy of both Portugal and Britain. Among the major factors 
that determined the positions of these countries vis-à-vis the 
incipient project of European integration were the type of 
relationship that both countries had (or wanted to preserve) with 
their overseas territories, the relationship they had with the superpow-
ers (in particular the United States), their perception of the Franco-
German relations, and their own understanding of the process of 
European political and economic integration. 
Britain’s colonial power was dealt a severe blow when it withdrew 
from India in 1947. Nine years later, in 1956, its African colonies suc-
ceeded in securing their independence – the same year when the British 
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endured the humiliation of the Suez Crisis. By this time, Portugal was 
still peddling and pandering to lusotropicalist propaganda, arguing 
that it was playing a “civilising” role in its overseas provinces in Africa, 
only to be stirred from its imperial sleep by the UN General Assembly 
Fourth Committee in January 1957. Nevertheless, unrest had already 
been rippling across the Portuguese possessions in India from 1954, 
resulting in the violent suppression of the Satyagraha campaigns. The 
Indian Government policy of “wait and watch” from 1955 to 1961, 
with several diplomatic representations to the Portuguese regime 
requesting the relinquishing of control of Portuguese Goa, would 
come to an end with the formal annexation of the territories on 19 
December 1961. By then, the death knell of the Portuguese imperial 
dream in Africa had sounded in the coffee-growing areas of northern 
Angola, where the UPA (União das Populações de Angola, Union of the 
Angolan Peoples) organised a rebellion that led to the massacre of 
hundreds of white settlers and Angolan natives on 15 March.
The Cold War had polarised the world, but the Asian-African 
Conference held at Bandung in 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement, 
founded in 1961, tried to transcend that scenario by seeking to abstain 
from serving the interests of the big powers and by backing the anti-co-
lonial independence struggles across the world. Therefore, besides the 
threat posed by the Soviet bloc to Western Europe and the American 
plans for the region – which both London and Lisbon dismissed as 
naïve –, the colonial question was one more piece of the equation which 
complicated Europe’s efforts to steer a course of sustainable economic 
development. Nevertheless, both Britain and Portugal hoped that their 
overseas territories might help to leverage their bargaining power in 
the setting-up of a free trade area in the context of the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
When finally European integration began to take shape, the two 
countries reacted cautiously. The economic and political impacts of 
such an unprecedented project were difficult to gauge, all the more 
so because it entailed an understanding of transnational cooperation 
that did not conform to the old logic of trying to converge commer-
cial or financial interests of two competing nations.
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This article aims to shed some light on the political and ideologi-
cal agendas of both London and Lisbon during the process leading up 
to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, on 25 March 1957. It focuses on 
four main questions. The first one is how the colonial issue still influ-
enced the attitudes of Portugal and Great Britain towards the process 
of European integration. The second one explores how the risks of 
commercial and economic isolation conditioned their understanding 
of the potential of a European common market. The third question 
addresses their inability to identify themselves with the principles and 
values of the European project. The fourth one seeks to ascertain the 
views exchanged between the British and Portuguese governments on 
issues such as the customs union, the common market and the free 
trade area.
1. The Weight of the Colonial Legacy 
The end of the Second World War spelled the decline and fall of 
the imperial projects that had remained standing after the Great War. 
London, Paris, Haya, Brussels and Lisbon believed that it was still 
possible to pursue strategies of revitalization and modernization of 
their colonial possessions, in the hope that this alone might help to 
overcome the fragile state of their economies and regain the former 
status of international powers. However, all of them were well aware 
that pressure would be mounting as the years went by and the inde-
pendence movements gathered momentum under the aegis of the 
two world superpowers. Each country sought to meet such challenges 
in their own way. Unlike the British, who after the war were aware 
that keeping its colonial heritage represented a Sisyphean effort, the 
Portuguese were convinced that they could go on staving off the threats 
to their overseas territories indefinitely, an attitude of exceptionalism 
and isolationism that would cost the Salazar’s government dearly. 
From 1961 onwards, the colonial conflicts intensified, eroded the 
regime at home and abroad, and exhausted Portugal’s financial and 
military resources, seriously impairing the economic development of 
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the country. Moreover, this obsession with an obsolescent vision of 
Africa as Lisbon’s playground for its imperial fantasies, only matched 
in degree by its policies of violent repression and ideological control 
both in the metropolis and overseas, would further isolate the regime 
from the ongoing process of construction of European cooperation 
throughout the 1960s and early part of the 1970s.
After 1945, Great Britain’s status of great economic power plum-
meted and lacked significant surplus to send abroad. (Porter 1984, 
319) The British soon realised that their resources were limited for 
the effort of postwar reconstruction. The costs alone of keeping India 
yielded little or no economic and strategic advantages whatsoever. 
(Judd 2006, 343) Before the conflict with Nazi Germany, Britain still 
believed that the demands for the right of self-governance of the col-
onies could be neutralised with the creation of the Commonwealth, 
formalised in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster (though it was not 
immediately ratified by some of the dominions). This solution set 
up an institutional framework of autonomous or semiautonomous 
territories bound by their allegiance to the Crown. Not without visi-
ble tensions, Britain would end up granting independence to India, 
Pakistan and Burma in 1947 and Ceylon in 1948, while the commu-
nist insurgency in Malaysia in that year would postpone its independ-
ence until August 1957, when it became an independent member of 
the Commonwealth of Nations. The Middle East was no less chal-
lenging. In 1948, Britain walked out of Palestine, leaving Jews and 
Arabs to fight out an interminable war – a decision which drew crit-
icism from Isaiah Berlin, who, in a letter to Chaim Weizmann dated 
6 June 1948, denounced the “crass blindness and stupidity on Bevin 
and Attlee’s part.” (Berlin 2009, 50) The same historian, in a letter to 
Joseph Alsop dated 21 October 1949, again touched a nerve regarding 
Britain’s newly found imperial status. As a consequence of the war, 
the former imperial power became almost entirely dependent on the 




My impression of our rulers is that they are like an acrobat on a tight-
rope with a large net cosily below them; they know that if they fall they will 
fall into the net (USA) and will suffer at worst loss of face but not of life. 
They realise subconsciously that they will never be allowed to sink utterly, 
if only from the most self-regarding motives. And this takes away from the 
acute sense of crisis which otherwise would drive them dotty. They are like 
the son who knows that his debts will ultimately be settled by his annoyed 
and angry parents, with much humiliation all around, but that he will not 
go to jail. (Berlin, 132; see also Bew 2017, 432)
And indeed humiliation was inflicted later in 1956 when Gamal 
Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal and drove the British mili-
tary out of Egypt. Symptomatic of the attitude of subservience towards 
the United States that Isaiah Berlin had previously censured, Britain 
had aligned with the position of the American Ally when the case was 
brought before the Security Council of the United Nations. Yet, at 
Sèvres, Britain, France and the new state of Israel secretly plotted to 
occupy Egypt without letting the Americans learn of their intent. The 
military actions were unfolding according to plan until the moment 
when the United States threatened to withdraw its support to the 
British pound. Anthony Eden caved in to the demand of the newly 
elected Eisenhower and was forced to call the whole thing off on 7 
November, only two days after the Anglo-French troops had landed in 
Egypt. Not only did public opinion in Britain oppose the attack, but 
also the few remaining pro-British Arab friends were compelled to 
act against British interests. (Balfour-Paul 1999, 510) To add insult to 
injury, India, seeking to distance itself from its former colonial rulers, 
sided with Nasser, thus putting into practice the policy of non-align-
ment. (Nayudu, 2016)
The situation of Britain’s tropical colonies was no less problematic. 
If, from an economic perspective, the late 1940s and 1950s were the 
time when the ties between the colonial power and its colonies “were 
closest of all,” (Porter 1984, 321) this was so because the capitalist 
exploitation was far more intensive – which tightened Britain’s grip 
on the colonies and caused African nationalism to spring suddenly 
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into full force. This phenomenon, however, took on different forms 
depending on the African territory and, therefore, British rulers had to 
follow different timetables for decolonization and transfer of power, 
(Falola & Roberts 1999, 528) with questionable, not to say disas-
trous, results for the local populations in the long run. (Lonsdane 
1999, 543) Throughout the 1950s, plans devised for each region all 
hinged upon the idea that the white settler would have the final say. 
The grouping of the colonies of East-Central Africa into two federa-
tions would allow one colony, mostly controlled by white settlers, to 
dominate the other two weaker territories. Another approach, known 
as “partnership” or “multiracialism” – although appearing to allow 
power to be shared between the Europeans and Africans – strongly 
favoured the former according to a formula of “parity” which would 
give 50,000 white settlers living in Kenya the same number of rep-
resentatives to the legislature as those representing the 5 million 
Africans. (Porter 1984, 328-9) None of these measures managed to 
improve the economic and living conditions of the colonised peo-
ples. As Tomlinson wryly argues, “the suggestion remains that British 
rule did not leave a substantial legacy of wealth, health, or happiness 
to the majority of the subjects of the Commonwealth.” (1999, 375)
Substantive ideological differences separated Britain from its 
oldest ally. Portugal’s understanding of its colonial mission was less 
linked to the logic of capitalism than to a messianic vision of the 
country’s role in world history. Article 2 of the Colonial Act (Decree-
law no. 22:465, promulgated on 8 July 1930) determined that “the 
Portuguese Nation’s organic essence is to play the historic role of 
possessing and colonising the overseas dominions and of civilising 
the indigenous populations living therein, while also exercising the 
moral influence that is conceded by the Patronage of the East”. In 
fact, the whole Act was about the renationalization of the colonies, 
where any concessions to foreign capitalists were to be subjected to a 
more integrated and patriotic vision of the development of the colo-
nies. (Oliveira 2014, 484) Further centralization and concentration of 
colonial power ensued with the approval of both the Organic Charter 
of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and the Overseas Administrative 
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Reform in November 1933. Despite some minor concessions, the 
decision-making process was left entirely in the hands of the gov-
ernment. The revision of the Organic Charter in 1946 implemented 
some principles of decentralization and later in 1951, the constitu-
tional revision introduced a slight change in discourse, replacing the 
concept of colonies with that of “overseas provinces”, each entitled 
to its own capital and local government. With this change of lexicon, 
Portugal resumed the assimilationist philosophy of its eighteenth 
century imperial tradition. It also brought it closer to the spirit of the 
French Union (1946-1958), created with the Constitution of 1946 
and which turned the old colonies of the French West Indies into 
“overseas departments”, and the new colonies into “overseas territo-
ries”. The aim was “the assimilation of the overseas territories into a 
greater France, inhabited by French citizens, and blessed by French 
culture.” (Simpson 2004, 286) This assimilationist ideology, how-
ever, not only proved unable to prevent but actually precipitated the 
colonial war cycle from 1946 to 1962, in Indochina and in North 
Africa, since it refused to countenance a political evolution towards 
solutions of self-governance and of self-determination in their terri-
tories. (Dreyfus et al. 1980, 468) The concept underlying the French 
Union would be replaced by the ideal of the French Community only 
in 1958, when a new constitution was promulgated in response to the 
Algerian crisis. The community was to take the form of a federation, 
comprising those territories that would choose to be treated either 
as parts of France, or as separate autonomous territories enjoying 
self-government – except for foreign policy, which was to be dictated 
by an Executive Council, a Senate and a Court of Arbitration.
What the French claimed was their mission civilatrice did not differ 
much from the idea contained in Article 133 of the 1951 Portuguese 
Constitution, which maintained that it was the Portuguese Nation’s 
function to “communicate and disseminate” among the indigenous 
populations the “benefits of its civilisation”. This choice of words 
watered down the much blunter “civilising” objective stated in the 
1930 Colonial Act. This operation was, however, more of a cos-
metic nature. The living conditions of the local populations belied 
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the so-called civilizational mission of the Portuguese, who kept the 
Africans in a state of abject ignorance (in 1956 only 1 percent of the 
Angolans was attending school). Neither did they hesitate to create 
administrative mechanisms to facilitate forced labour to feed the colo-
nial modes of production. (Oliveira 2014, 498-9) From an ideological 
angle, the state intended to remain vigilant and in control of capital-
ist ambitions in its overseas territories. However, the fact remains that 
British capital enjoyed a privileged position within the framework of 
major foreign investments, at least until the after the end the Second 
World War, when American and South African investment started to 
intensify. (Idem, 491-2) The existing policies of promotion and devel-
opment of productive activities in the African territories (the first plan 
covered the period from 1953 to 1958) led to a significant increase 
of private investment and to a rise in the important migratory move-
ment from the metropolis (from 44,000 migrants to Angola in 1940 
to 173,000 in 1960, for instance). Unlike the policies adopted by the 
European powers in Africa, Portuguese state intervention gave prefer-
ence to the investment in infrastructures, while expenses on social pro-
grammes came very low on the list of priorities. (Alexandre 2000, 52-3)
2. Fighting the Risk of Isolation
The gradual loss of Britain’s imperial status from the late forties 
onwards added to the sense of crisis of national identity. The pro-
ject of Imperial Preference – subject to an intense debate ever since 
Joseph Chamberlain proposed it at the beginning of the twentieth 
century –, had failed to materialise, partly thanks to the pressure from 
the United States. However, this did not prevent the Commonwealth, 
under the so-called “favoured status”, (Gowland et al. 2009, 46) 
from remaining Great Britain’s main source of food supply due to a 
low-tariff regime that favoured imports from its member-states. This 
alone represented about one third of Britain’s imports until the early 
1960s. Not without its costs, though. The percentage of exports to 
the Commonwealth decreased significantly, while Europe grew in 
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importance over the years, until in 1965 it succeeded in supplanting 
the Commonwealth as its main export destination. Countries such 
as South Africa, Canada and Australia realised, especially after the 
Suez crisis, that their trade relationship with Britain could not go on 
compromising their trade ambitions in relation to other parts of the 
globe, in particular the United States, Asia and developing countries. 
The British found themselves at a crossroads as their role as leading 
nation of the Commonwealth declined. Their heavy reliance on the 
USA, which made it difficult for them to steer their own course and 
set their own objectives, along with their inability to go on securing 
the defence of the Empire (as demonstrated by their withdrawal from 
Greece in March 1947 given their state of near bankruptcy and the risk 
of being embroiled in the civil war that had broken out in September 
1946), revealed the degree of their weakness and their growing iso-
lation. (Judd 2006, 353) The Continent now seemed more likely to 
offer a way out of the predicament Britain found itself in. It provided 
the opportunity to regain its international status and to reconfigure 
its economic development model. 
Portugal’s isolation was no less problematic. As far as his foreign 
policy was concerned, Salazar seemed confused and unable to set a 
clear course to help the country cope with the new world order. On 
the one hand, he was reluctant to accept the emergence of the two 
superpowers and the decline of Britain as a sea power, now replaced 
by the Americans. On the other, he failed to realise the importance of 
the role of the newlyerected United Nations in the post-WWII order. 
As Portugal had been set aside when the organisation was founded in 
April 1945 and the USSR would later veto its application for mem-
bership in 1946, the regime was shut out from the initial debates that 
would redraw the geopolitical map of the world. As a consequence, 
Salazar failed to come to terms with the end of the old Europe as the 
centre stage of international politics. The Soviet threat and the intensi-
fication of the Cold War prompted Salazar to sign the bilateral agree-
ment of military cooperation with the United States in February 1948 
and shortly afterwards, in December, to accept talks to formally join 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. There were good reasons for 
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NATO to tolerate the presence of an authoritarian regime in the midst 
of democratic nations. Severiano Teixeira advances two explanations. 
On the one hand, the Americans could not afford to overlook the geo-
strategic importance of Portugal in the Atlantic. A military base on the 
Azores would allow the Americans to rapidly deploy their forces in 
case the Soviet Bloc attacked the Old Continent. On the other hand, 
if Portugal refused to join the organisation this might produce a dom-
ino effect that could lead other countries not to adhere, thus weak-
ening the organisation. (2000, 82-3) Salazar may have succeeded in 
reaping some benefits from this recognition (regaining its “Atlantic 
vocation” and its intermediary role with Franco’s Spain, for instance), 
but they would be to no avail when Portugal finally joined the United 
Nations in 1955 and its hotly contested colonial policy came under 
fierce attack. In January 1957, the regime was particularly targeted at a 
meeting of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (also 
known as the Fourth Committee). (Nogueira 2000, 439-42)
By the end of the 1950s Portugal was a country of little less than 
nine million people and with a GDP per capita of only 357.39 USD 
(in sharp contrast with Denmark’s 1,364.52 and the Netherland’s 
1,068.78 (also in 1960); in France the figure was 1,219.02 in 1959, 
and in Britain 1,218.00 in 1958). (World Bank, 2018) 40.3% of the 
population was illiterate and only 0.6% held a university degree. Used 
to keeping a tight grip on such a poorly developed country, Salazar 
was not particularly enthusiastic about the process of European con-
struction. Not only did he see Africa as an extension of Europe, but 
was also a stern advocate of the civilising mission of the Portuguese 
there. The neutrality status that he succeeded in keeping during the 
war and the perception of Europe as a territory of conflicting and irrec-
oncilable political interests had driven him away from the discussions 
that were to shape the new Europe. Again, this was a new conjuncture 
that Salazar had some difficulty in coming to terms with. However, as 
the European question started demanding concrete answers, Salazar 
had no alternative but to meet these challenges on a ground that was 
familiar to him, namely in the context of the Old Alliance. Britain’s 
positions helped to set the tone of Salazar’s attitudes towards Europe. 
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True, the Marshal Plan in 1949-1950 had ushered Portugal into the 
dynamics of European cooperation, in the particular in the context 
of its participation in the OEEC, founded in April 1948, whose main 
goal was to set up European Recovery Programme set up to justify 
the American effort. This experience, however, failed to draw Portugal 
closer to its continental counterparts. When London moved away 
from the discussions leading to signing of the Treaty of Rome (offi-
cially called Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) in 
March 1957, and invested instead in the creation of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Lisbon followed suit. (Andresen-
Leitão 2004; Alípio 2001) 
Besides, while shyly accepting the financial aid of the Marshall 
Plan, Portugal was not particularly successful in the first economic 
development plan (“I Plano de Fomento”) that it was compelled 
to draw up and implemented from 1953 for a period of six years. 
According to Brandão de Brito, though its objectives already sig-
nalled an important inflection in the economic policy of the New 
State (growth of the income per capita; improvement of productiv-
ity; reallocation of manpower; qualification of active population; 
and fighting illiteracy) as the logic of Corporatism gave way to the 
market economy, little was achieved. (2000, 114) While Brandão 
de Brito speaks of an annual average growth of the GNP per capita 
of only 3%, Ribeiro de Menezes advances Marcello Caetano’s more 
optimistic assessment, according to whom the GNP grew by 25% 
and the population by 300,000. (Menezes 2009, 347) Whatever the 
true results of the development plan might have been, they did not 
make Salazar more sensitive to the economic potential of the EEC. As 
far as Europe was concerned, Portugal had already aligned its posi-
tion with that of Britain’s, by embracing the EFTA project (which the 
British themselves would later abandon when they joined the EEC in 
1973), and by attempting to launch the Portuguese equivalent of the 
Commonwealth, the so-called Portuguese Economic Space (Espaço 
Económico Português), exclusively involving the metropole and the 
overseas provinces. (Idem, 116) 
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3. The Gravitational Pull of European Integration
There were sound reasons that justified Britain’s new approach to 
Europe. Shortly after the war, the industrial output was well below (at 
best 20% below) the levels of 1938. To prevent the spread of com-
munism economic recovery was top priority. Pre-war liberalism had 
taken a heavy toll on the politics of the Old Continent. Keynesian-
inspired policies of state interventionism gradually emerged as the 
way to prevent the social costs of the excesses of unbridled capital-
ism. Full employment, curbing inflation and balance of foreign trade 
took priority. Nationalisation of many industries in Britain (trans-
port, electric power, coal and steel) and France (banking, insurance, 
energy and Renault) tested the degree of such interventionism. The 
American financial aid under the Marshall Plan granted governments 
further means to control and guide the development of the economy. 
As a result of these policies, economic growth from 1947 to 1960 was 
unprecedented. Industrial output in France went from 74 in 1938 to 
153 in 1960, in West Germany from 87 to 144, in Britain from 69 
to 132 (index 100, 1953). (Dreyfus et al. 1996, 470) Competition 
between France and Germany, however, could not remain unre-
solved. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), proposed by the French foreign Minister Robert Schuman, 
was an attempt to prevent an escalade of tension – which might trig-
ger yet another military conflict – resulting from the internationalisa-
tion of the Ruhr area. Schuman, however, was not solely worried with 
pre-empting competition between countries over natural resources. 
He also sought to establish the principle of the equality of states and 
of solidarity between nations over the traditional logic of the politics 
of domination. In the medium and long term, the ECSC paved the 
way to the acceleration of economic and industrial growth of its mem-
bers, promoted the Franco-German rapprochement, and – which is 
more politically important – fostered the idea of a united Europe. 
(Dreyfus et al. 1996, 472) This idea did not revolve solely around eco-
nomic, but also social development. As Jean Monnet defended in his 
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declaration dated 23 November 1955, when he spoke of the United 
States of Europe, “our organisations, socialist parties and unions, 
Christian-democrats, liberals, Germans, Belgians, French, Italians, 
Luxembourgers and Dutch believe that our peoples’ hopes to improve 
our living conditions, justice, liberty and peace won’t materialise if 
we remain separated in our national efforts”. The construction of the 
European project would necessarily entail measures for the “harmo-
nisation of social policies”. (FO 371/122022/37)
The British saw the creation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with suspicion, especially because it was based on Europe’s 
lack of strength to respond to the world domination by the two 
superpowers. The Spaak report (Comite Intergouvernemental 1956) 
acknowledged the situation of weakness of the European industry vis-
à-vis that of the United States and of the Soviet bloc. As they stated in 
the foreword: 
Between the United States, which in almost every field alone accounts for 
half of the world’s production, and the countries which, under a collectivist 
regime of one-third of the world’s population, increase their production at 
the rate of 10 or 15% year, Europe, which formerly had a monopoly on pro-
cessing industries and derived substantial resources from its overseas pos-
sessions, sees its external position weakening, its influence dwindling, and 
its capacity for progress lost in its divisions. (Comite Intergouvernemental 
1956, 9)
Britain did not identify itself with this portrayal of the European 
economy, all the more so because the creation of the EEC might lead 
to a situation where Europe would be competing against the United 
States and challenging its power. In a meeting in late January 1957 
between an official of the United States Embassy and R. F. Stretton, a 
staff member of the Foreign Office, the latter ventured to give a word 
of warning to the Americans about the Euratom. He stated that “the 
earlier American enthusiasm for European federation had been born 
of a natural desire to get Europe off America’s back some day, but the 
corresponding European attitude could not be guaranteed to produce 
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the kind of Europe which the United States (or of course ourselves) 
wanted.” And he added: “The Third Force idea did not grow out of a 
desire to collaborate with the United States but out of distrust of her”, 
and therefore, “the Relance Européene would need to be carefully 
watched from this point of view”. 
This perceived attrition was inconsistent with the Europe’s 
dependence on American military power for its security, a depend-
ence that released it from the concern of having to set up a common 
defence policy – a project that, nevertheless, had been rejected by the 
French Assembly in 1954. However, the British were not alone in their 
scepticism about the emerging EEC. The Dutch were not particularly 
pleased with high tariffs being charged to countries from outside the 
Community, which could lead to an inflation of prices, and, just like 
the Belgians, were worried that Britain had not joined the Messina 
plan. In the French Assembly, several conservative MPs, including 
Gaullists, voted against the Treaty of Rome, while the Left opposed 
the creation of a “petite Europe” and deplored the absence of Britain. 
(Bossuat 1995) In Germany, Adenauer’s Economy minister, Ludwig 
Erhard, promoter of the social market system and a stern advocate 
of free trade, wrote a ten-page letter to the Kanzler in September call-
ing the proposal to unify the continent a “macroeconomic nonsense” 
(“volkswirtschaftlicher Unsinn”). (Enders 1997, 161) He feared the 
neo-mercantilist policy of a customs union might negatively affect 
the trade flux with Britain and lead to price distortion. Erhard would 
rather have a Free Trade Association with the British – excluding, of 
course, the agricultural sector. Having lost its Eastern markets and 
deprived of overseas territories, Germany could have benefited from 
a more flexible and wider free trade area, he claimed, instead of 
being confined to the signatories of the Treaty of Rome. What Erhard 
failed to grasp was that thanks to the EEC there would be a signif-
icant increase in trade exchanges between its members and in par-
ticular with Germany, whose industrial dynamism was vital for the 
economic recovery of the whole continent. As no country in Western 
Europe was entirely self-sufficient, the increased interdependence 
required cross-border cooperation, planning, regulation, common 
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growth objectives and subsidies. Actually, while most of the Ruhr 
industrialists sided with Erhard, there were important stakeholders in 
Germany who would take an opposite view. His political opponents 
in the SPD and the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union 
Confederation), the new trade union federation, feared that Germany 
could return to the capitalist economic system that they claimed had 
been responsible for the rise of the Nazis. The Left believed that it was 
possible to effect a transformation of German industrial culture by 
socializing key industries and introducing an “economic democracy.” 
(Hook 2004, 233) There were also important voices on the side of the 
German industry who did not see eye to eye with Erhard’s advocacy of 
free competition. On 21 December 1955, the chairman of the German 
Manufacturers’ Federation, Fritz Berg spoke in favour of a “European 
attitude” by German manufacturers, and called for the establishment 
of a common market “in the widest sense of the word” by means of 
a Customs Union within a period of 10 to 15 years. Berg’s “European 
attitude” entailed more than just short-term commercial or financial 
interests; it entailed a political vision of the future, as he maintained 
that “German industry is ready to do its utmost to strengthen and 
complete the German-French understanding, even at the cost of new 
sacrifices.” (FO 371/122022/46)
Judd argues that what brought all these countries together 
(Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West 
Germany) was above all the defence of their selfish national interest 
and that the removal of trade obstacles with their neighbours was 
motivated by the lessons of the past. (Judd 2006, 356) However, what 
cemented Germany’s position in relation to the EEC was not so much 
the concerns about the economy, but Adenauer’s political commit-
ment to France.
Besides sharing Britain’s reservations, Salazar realised that the 
ideological tenets of the EEC represented a threat to the regime. As 
Ribeiro de Menezes aptly puts it:
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Supranationalism was a threat to both Portugal and Salazar’s power; the 
evolving European ideal posed a direct challenge to the New State’s author-
itarian principles, and had thus to be combated. Salazar was a nationalist; 
nations were for him the basic building blocks of his ideal world order, 
and any attempt to build a new world order which ignored them was, he 
believed, doomed to fail. Salazar was especially suspicious of the engine 
driving the European ideal forward, which he identified as American diplo-
macy. (2009, 348) 
As Salazar himself wrote, in a letter dated 7 March 1953, when 
approached by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul van 
Zeeland, about a the possibility of creation of a European federation:
The United States, in their ingeniousness and levity of opinion, do not 
see for Europe any political solution other than unity through a federation. 
France, who seems to us a war-worn country and who appears to be haunted 
by its own independence, adopts the idea as the easiest way to avoid an 
isolated German rearmament, potentially hostile in the future. The nations 
surrounding France seem convinced, for different reasons, that that is the 
best way to save Europe and maybe the only way to secure American aid, 
either as a military power, or as a financial resource. (Apud Nogueira 2000, 
281; my translation)
The intellectual arrogance with which Salazar looks down on the 
American policy towards Europe, his apparent disdain for France’s 
weakness, and his pessimism about the future of a federal solution 
for Europe, might be easily confused with an affirmation of political 
strength, but they rather betray his very own weaknesses. In his assess-
ment, American aid is not regarded as an outstanding opportunity 
to help put the European economy back on its tracks, but as the life-
buoy of feeble nations; France is not seeking a peaceful solution for 
Franco-German relations, but rather seems paralysed with the fear of 
another military confrontation, while proving unable to govern itself 
as an independent nation. As European democracies become more 
involved in developing strategies of cooperation at both political and 
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economic levels, Salazar remains sceptical about the results of such 
efforts and misconstrues the whole issue as a matter of American 
manipulation and/or French weakness. Instead of seeking to explore 
the potential of the new political geography of European coopera-
tion, the dictator preferred to stick to the age-old cartography of the 
empire. As he once stated, “if I am allowed to be the interpreter of 
the feeling of the Portuguese people, I will say that their love for their 
independence and for their overseas territories, as a relevant and 
essential part of their history, is so deep, that they find the very idea of 
federation, affecting the former and the latter, absolutely repulsive.” 
(Idem, 283) Franco Nogueira further discloses Salazar’s doubts about 
a future federation. There were only two ways in which this federation 
could come into being. It would be either by force of a federator or 
by slow evolution. Hitler had failed, but Russia might still succeed, at 
least in those countries under its control. Besides, states and individ-
uals would pay a heavy price for that federal solution (abandonment 
of lands, relocation or concentration of industries; mass migrations; 
economic imbalances; losses of capital), though he conceded that in 
the long run it might be better for everyone. Given the existing irrec-
oncilable interests, politicians could never accomplish this overnight, 
even if by means of carefully drafted treaties. Salazar clang on to the 
century-old tradition of the nation state and to his belief in the virtues 
of nationalism, which was, he claimed, as deeply embedded in mind 
of the average European as the “instinct of ownership”. Then there 
was the problem of the colonies, which would have to be absorbed by 
this supranational structure – an idea that might please those coun-
tries that had already lost them (Italy and Germany), but that would 
certainly meet, so Salazar believed, the opposition of the French and 
Belgians. Only when all these oppositions had been overcome and 
all the sacrifices made could this European State start rationalising 
its production based on the resources provided by the overseas ter-
ritories. Salazar was still too obsessed with the colonising mission 
of Europe, but his assessment was right about one thing though: 
only Germany, thanks to its strength and capacity, would be able to 
lead the destinies of federation. In Salazar’s projections, Britain plays 
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a special role, but never of subordination to the European project, 
as it already headed a federation of states. Full commitment to the 
European project would mean the loss of its world status as the mem-
bers of the Commonwealth would start seeking other markets and 
trading partners. In Salazar’s conservative perspective, a hypothetical 
union of states should never endanger an existing one. Therefore, 
Britain should go on being “a factor of balance between the United 
States and a federation where Germany will come to play a leading 
role.” (Idem, 282-3) 
Regardless of Salazar’s misgivings about the future of Europe, the 
ambitious goals of the EEC and its impact on the European space 
could not be ignored, as Portugal’s main trading partners were now 
gathered in a single economic and fiscal space where the Portuguese 
would have no say whatsoever. The new organisation would be fol-
lowing a common customs policy, making decisions that would cer-
tainly affect the country’s economy for the years to come. Portugal 
was not alone in its apprehensions, for other members of the OEEC 
voiced similar concerns. In order to skirt the tariffs barrier of the EEC, 
in July 1956 Britain brought to OEEC Council of ministers the idea 
of an industrial free-trade zone (FTZ), where each country could still 
establish its own customs tariff, thus allowing the British and the 
Portuguese to keep their colonial preferences. The intergovernmental 
committee created to that effect and presided by Reginald Maudling 
failed to convince France and the other members of the EEC about 
the benefits of the FTZ. (Alípio 2006, 22-3) Nevertheless, even the 
FTZ presented the other members of the OEEC (Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Portugal and Turkey) with major difficulties. Their relative 
state of industrial underdevelopment could hardly be overcome if 
access to the European markets could not be guaranteed with special 
provisions. The absence of such conditions would have asphyxiated 
emerging industries and worsen their economic isolation, with neg-
ative impacts on unemployment and trade deficit. The agricultural 
sector was also problematic, including for the British themselves, who 
sought to keep the subject out of the talks. The Portuguese position 
took time to take shape and by the end of 1956 Portugal required 
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agriculture (which represented as much as 40% of its exports) to be 
included and a special industrial scheme to be set up. (Andresen-
Leitão 2004, 286-8) Portugal’s terms would be agreed on only later in 
October 1958, when an experts panel headed by J. A. Melander visited 
the country and met with ministers, public servants and economic 
lobbies. Correia de Oliveira, responsible for the diplomatic team, suc-
ceeded in driving home the message that Portugal was able to carry 
out major development projects, (Alípio 2006, 73) but still needed 
a longer transition period before it could comply with the customs 
obligations of the FTZ. By this time, Salazar could not afford to see 
the negotiations fail, as it would exclude Portugal from a European-
wide agreement. (Andresen-Leitão 2007, 49)
4. Contacts Between the British and Portuguese Governments 
on the “European Initiative”
On 19 January 1956, Salazar delivered a speech that deserved the 
attention of the Foreign Office (FO 371/122022). In it he spoke of 
two movements occurring in the world, for some complementary, for 
others contradictory: nationalism, that formed the basis of numer-
ous states; and internationalism (“and on occasions of even supra-
nationalism”), which thrived in those countries that were “tired of 
their existence as independent nations.” It becomes obvious that in 
his case for nationalism, Salazar valorised national identity as the fac-
tor that legitimises the existence of the state. This argument, however, 
is a double-edged sword, as it also serves to justify movements for 
national self-determination, which compromises the very existence 
of the colonial powers. Here he tried to square the circle, arguing 
that such movements could lead to a multiplication of independent 
states that would lead to the “liquidation of what previously existed” 
and that would lack the capacity to “administer themselves with true 
independence” and to integrate themselves, in moral and juridical 
terms, in the international order. On the other hand, he conceded 
that internationalism did not necessarily entail the weakening of 
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the state. In fact, he admitted that “civilization seems to be heading 
towards uniformity; hence a reinforcement of internationalism in law 
and in the institutions charged with studying it and applying it, is to 
be expected”. He also agreed that in some areas cooperation among 
sovereign states, through the adherence to common statutes, could 
be a favourable factor in the solution of certain problems. In theory, 
Salazar had nothing to object to. When it came to the movement of 
European integration in the form of a federation or confederation, 
however, Salazar was less generous in his appraisal, as he believed 
there was “a certain obscurity” surrounding it. Why some states 
should defend it was something abundantly clear to Salazar, but he 
could not understand why others should accept, and even “bless”, 
what he called “this sort of national liquidation”. He was thinking 
of those states whose “heterogeneous and dispersed nature (…), the 
vastness of their interests outside Europe, the diversity of the institu-
tions through which they govern themselves [and] the disparity of 
political and moral climates” should make them wary of such integra-
tion process. Portugal, in Salazar’s geography, occupied a peripheral 
position in Europe, which, instead of being a cause for concern, was 
considered “a gift of Providence”, as it allowed the regime to await – 
“in this corner of the Peninsula” – the future doctrinal developments 
of the question and to see how it would first be put to practice, if ever. 
Preferring prudence over precipitate action, he claimed that the gov-
ernment’s position was to defend “cooperation which grows steadily 
intimate and an increasing solidarity without prejudice of national 
autonomy, which still provides (…) the simplest form of progress and 
method of defending the interests of the peoples concerned.” And he 
concludes:
Our nationalism, constructive without being aggressive, cooperative 
without exclusiveness, but with its roots in the soil and in the souls of the 
people, may well continue to prove the best defence against daring exper-
iments, the benefits of which unfortunately cannot be judged until after 




A few weeks later, on 9 February 1956, Foreign Office officials ana-
lysed his speech and, in the minutes sent to Anthony Eden, they high-
lighted the fact that Salazar, while favouring cooperation on OEEC 
lines, was very critical of the “daring experiments” that might lead 
to what he called “national liquidation”. While not entirely dismiss-
ing the possibility of a European federation, Salazar did not move an 
inch in relation to the positions he had expressed in the letter to van 
Zeeland three years before.
Despite Salazar’s claims about the apparent self-reliance of the 
Portuguese regime in international matters, on 8 February, Charles 
Stirling sent the report of a meeting on 7 between a member of 
the Embassy staff and Dr Ruy Teixeira Guerra, Director-general of 
Economic Affairs at the Portuguese Foreign Ministry. It was suggested 
that the Portuguese delegate to the OEEC ministerial meeting should 
“discuss tactics” with H. Ellis-Rees in advance. Paulo Cunha wanted 
to know what the British line was on the Common Market, Euratom 
and Article 14 of the OEEC Convention, so that he and Salazar could 
concert a position before the Council. (FO 371/122022/M611/19) 
Guerra’s misgivings about Article 14 of the OEEC Convention 
(which stated that all decisions should be taken by mutual agree-
ment and that the abstention of any member would not invalidate 
the decisions of the other members) had to do with the fact that it was 
a mechanism that prevented the national legislatures from rejecting 
both the Euratom and the common market. The unanimity rule, as 
it was worded, would allow some members to go ahead with what-
ever joint projects they wished without the risk of being blocked by 
members not interested in any particular case under discussion, and 
who would have to abstain. This meant that Europe ran the risk of 
splitting into two camps as some members would lose the ability to 
influence the development of the Messina project. In the memo sent 
to the Foreign Office, Stirling stated that the Portuguese government 
had realised that “it would be useless for them to put forward pro-
posals unless you were in agreement; they needed to know in which 
direction you propose to give a lead in order that they might consider 
what support they could give.”
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The British government knew that the Messina countries would try 
to work out the Common Market scheme within the framework of the 
OEEC, but the British would not seek to encourage it. (FO 371/122022/
M611/19) In fact, both Britain and the United States were aware that 
a six-nation community might “evolve protectionist tendencies”. The 
Americans could hardly affect the chances of success of Messina, but 
the British were counting on American support to help them influ-
ence the outcome, working against the Messina plan by pushing their 
policy on the OEEC approach. On 20 January 1956, P. Thorneycroft, 
President of the Board of Trade, wrote to Eden, who was about to visit 
Washington, asking him to warn Eisenhower of the “grave political 
and commercial dangers which will ensue if a discriminatory bloc is 
set up by the Six”. (FO 371/122022/63) Again, the concern was the 
commercial cohesion of the Commonwealth, which ran the risk of 
being “seriously disturbed if we are ousted from the European Market 
by the institution of a Common Market”. This would leave Britain 
with no alternative but to discouraging the Six from going ahead with 
the project, even if that entailed “coming out in open opposition to 
their ideals”. However, at the same time, Thorneycroft knew that if a 
Common Market came into being, the British could not afford to stay 
out. Like Salazar, he was also convinced that “the Americans are in 
a fool’s paradise about Messina”, and that are feeding an “illusion” 
about the Common Market, in the sense that they were convinced 
that it would strengthen Western Europe and would bind Germany 
into the western complex of nations. If a one-world trading system 
was ever to be built up, as both the British and Americans wanted, 
the customs union would pose a major threat, as the Messina coun-
tries would attenuate tariffs and other obstacles between themselves, 
but would discriminate against “the rest of us”. (FO 371/122022/64) 
Still, he was aware that even among British businesspeople there 
were those who would prefer Britain to join the Six, as they would be 
ousted from the European markets through discrimination in favour 
of their German competitors. The British were, therefore, up against 
the wall: faced with having to choose between the Common Market 
and Free Trade, they preferred to attempt an impossible move, which 
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was to progress towards freer trade and payments throughout the 
world and at the same time to work against the protectionist policies 
that the Common Market would entail. This was justifiable in the 
eyes of the British as the European project would disrupt “present 
policies of cooperation and hopes of future benefits from the world 
trade and payment policies which are accepted by all OEEC coun-
tries”, thus weakening the West and with the Germans going their 
own way. (FO 371/122022/14) There was yet another reason why the 
British, along with the Portuguese and the Norwegians, believed that 
the Messina plans were cause for serious apprehension. At the min-
isterial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris on 15-16 
December 1955, these three countries were afraid of the impact that 
a new supranational organisation would have on the international 
balance of power in the context of the Cold War. A European union, 
dominated by Germany as its strongest element, could constitute a 
“third force” that might pursue neutralist policies and seek to take an 
independent position in relation to the USSR and the United States. 
(FO 371/122022/18) One final reason was that Britain would lose its 
leadership on European matters, a leadership that, so they claimed, 
was partly responsible for the recovery and cohesion of Western 
Europe, and for the creation of the OEEC, NATO and what they then 
called the Western European Union (WEU).
Later, by mid December 1956, Stirling tried to consult the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister, Paulo Cunha, on the idea of the Free Trade Agreement, 
but there were reports that he was ill (Marcelo Caetano would replace 
him from 26 December to 11 February). He then decided to debrief the 
Foreign Office on the views of the President of the Council, which in his 
opinion seemed to lack depth. (FO 372/128331) As the Ambassador 
stated, “Dr Salazar knew something about the question but I got the 
impression that he had not studied it deeply.” In any case, Salazar knew 
that there were two opposing positions: that of the French, who were 
insisting on “the inner circle, or Customs Union, and wanted to bring 
in overseas territories”; and that of the British, who defended “the outer 
circle, or Free Trade Area, and did not want to include territories out-
side Europe.” Again, Salazar was particularly cautious about foreseeing 
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“the exact consequences of changes in economic structure such as were 
now being proposed.” This wariness made Stirling conclude that “the 
Portuguese will not be very forthcoming on this proposal”. However, he 
thought that they were not likely to take a strong line against it: “they 
would, I think, be nervous of being left out in the cold, and I should 
imagine that if solutions on the lines of your paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, 
can be considered it ought to be possible to bring them in”. In the 
Foreign Office minutes, J. M. Keaton, commenting on Stirling’s report, 
observed: “we do not want the Portuguese to be too forthcoming; but it 
would be useful to know where they stand on relating overseas territo-
ries to the free trade area. However, their attitude will no doubt emerge, 
possibly at the meeting in Brussels on January 11”.
However, even the British were struggling to drive home their own 
vision and terminology of the FTA. On 4 January 1957, the Foreign Office 
instructed the British Embassies that they should refer to the Messina pow-
ers by the title of “Customs and Economic Union”. On the other hand, 
the group of six countries to join the Messina powers in an FTA (Britain, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland) “should not be 
described by a separate name so as to avoid any possible implication 
that this group and the Customs and Economic Union are co-equals”. 
(FO 372/128331/415) In the draft version, the original sentence read 
“that they are a rival organization to the Customs and Economic Union”. 
They insisted that the FTA should “include (and not merely be associ-
ated with) the countries of the Customs & Economic Union”, and that 
the term “common market” should be avoided to describe either the 
Customs Union or the FTA. They also stressed that even the FTA should 
be called “European Industrial Free Trade Area”. The British Embassy in 
Paris objected to these terms. While agreeing with the concept of FTA, 
they stressed that using the term “Customs Union” in France would pres-
ent them with a problem, as “the French are unrepentant adherents of 
the term ‘marché commun’”. If they started talking about a “Customs 
Union”, it would not only increase the confusion among their French 
peers, but it would also constitute for them a painful reminder of the 
German “Zollverein”. They concluded that “Marché Commun has much 
happier ‘European’ connotations”. (FO 371/128331)
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On 7 February, the British government would send a memoran-
dum to the OEEC as a White Paper (Cmnd. 72) about the free trade 
area, which would not be entirely welcome by the other OEEC coun-
tries. (Ellison 2000, 127) This document was an attempt to regain 
negotiation power after the British delegation withdrew in November 
1956 from the work of Intergovernmental Committee, which had 
been set up at the Messina Conference. Britain expected the FTA to 
serve three purposes: firstly, to reinforce its position in relation to 
the Imperial Preference system, if it succeeded in maintaining it; sec-
ondly, to ensure that its dominant role in the OEEC would not be 
questioned; finally, to influence the process of European integration 
by seeking to bind the FTA with the Common Market. Paragraph 14 of 
the memorandum was particularly controversial, as it concerned the 
effect of the loss of the preferential position of the Commonwealth 
countries and the colonial territories on the British market. To the 
other members of the OEEC, the British government’s position was 
rather ambiguous, a fact that the British Prime Minister sought to 
explore to his advantage in the negotiations, as he hoped to the very 
last minute that the Imperial preference could be retained. (Camps 
2015, 115) The whole strategy backfired and the meeting did not run 
as expected. There was strong opposition (especially from the Danes 
and Dutch) to the British intention of excluding agriculture from the 
proposed FTA. The more the British trade delegates insisted on the 
need for both the FTA and the Common Market to come into exist-
ence at the same time, within the same timetable for trade liberal-
ization so as to prevent discrimination among the members of the 
OEEC, the less receptive were the other delegates. (Ellison 2000, 104) 
M. Spaak wanted to avoid a slowing-down of the negotiation process 
of the Treaty of Rome at all costs, (Camps 2015, 116) and although 
Paul Erhard, the German Minister of Economic Affairs, might be 
more sympathetic towards the British preference for a free trade area, 
the French were intellectually opposed to a system exclusively limited 
to matters of free trade. When the Treaty of Rome was finally signed, 
the British were still struggling to prove the benefits of the FTA to the 
founding members of the EEC.
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Conclusion
Britain, who once owned an empire “where the sun never set”, 
somehow started realizing that it was rapidly losing control of world 
affairs. First in Asia, then in Africa and now in Europe. When the 
Messina powers started redrafting the whole geopolitical and eco-
nomic map of Europe, the British wanted to be in – that is, to enjoy 
all the benefits of the Common Market – and, at the same time, to be 
out and to go on trading with whomever they wanted, especially with 
the Commonwealth countries and the United States. For Britain, it all 
boiled down to trade and payments and tariffs. In the negotiations 
leading to the Treaty of Rome, Britain tried to play the age-old game 
of divide and rule, by seeking the support of Ludwig Erhard and the 
champion of free competition, while exploring the fears of the French 
towards West Germany’s economic miracle. However, the British 
underestimated the political and social dimension of the European 
project and the need for France and Germany to avoid another conflict 
at all costs – something that could only be secured through a political 
vision that could transcend the logic of nationalism and of imperial 
arrogance. This logic had twice dictated the downfall of Europe in the 
twentieth century, and yet it still resonated with the views of key pol-
iticians in the corridors of power in London and Lisbon.
In fact, Salazar was too absorbed in stoking the flame of an empire 
he was convinced would not only restore the country’s grandeur, but 
also guarantee a certain degree of economic self-sufficiency. The idea 
of creating the Portuguese Economic Space was an attempt to find a 
solution – within the scope of domestic politics – to the major chal-
lenges the world economy was then facing, while seeking to enhance 
the status of the regime and to reinforce the territorial cohesion of 
what he believed was an eminently overseas nation. He persisted in 
this course despite the unequivocal signs of the gathering storm that 
was about to precipitate the downfall of the colonial project in the 
years to come. On the other hand, in Salazar’s eyes, Europe had been, 
for decades, a constant source of trouble and, to a large extent, he 
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remained wary of the Franco-German rapprochement and of how 
the new European project would play out. Unable to understand 
the full potential of that rapprochement and unwilling to meet the 
democratic demands both at home and abroad, Salazar preferred to 
remain aloof from continental politics. In that respect, he found it 
quite convenient to hide behind Britain’s qualms about the European 
Economic Community.
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